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Abstract 
The first part of the paper examines the objective of the study. Following, in the second part we continuo 
with analyses of the importance of FDI to transition economies of (SEEC) South East European Countries. 
The study examines the trend and characteristics of FDI based on geographical distribution of FDI in the 
SEECs and compare its amount with Central East European Countries (CEECs).  
 
In the third part, following the theoretical approach of FDI and empirical evidence identified by literature 
review of FDI determinants, we tried to identify some of the main host country determinants of FDI inflow 
in SEECs. For this reason, we employed panel data estimation. Using a sample of SEECs and panel data 
technique under  random effect specification the paper research the relationship between FDI, GDP growth, 
GDP per capita, number of inhabitants, trade openness, inflation, exchange rate, external debt and some 
technology development proxies. 
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1. Introduction  
Developing countries can gain potential benefits by attracting international capital flows. 
This is based on the grounds that Foreign capital through expanding domestic savings, usually at 
low levels, enable countries to increase their rate of capital accumulation.  In turn this lead to 
speediness of the development processes of the country through increasing long term growth 
prospects and wealth of the population. Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) as a type of foreign 
capital inflow can help to finance the increased needs for resources in developing countries and 
facilitate the transfer of managerial and technological know – how.  
Due to the weak relationship of South East European Countries (SEEC) with European 
Union Countries (EU), SEE Countries are less developed and receive less  FDI inflow in 
comparison to Central European Countries (CEC) and they are lagging well behind them in terms 
of speediness of transition processes. (Skuflic. L and Botric V, 2006).  
 Taking into account the importance of FDI in the future economic development of  
transition economies, the main objective of this study is to examine the determinants of FDI inflow 
in South East European Transition Economies. In the sample are included South East European 
Countries: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, 
Serbia and Montenegro and Slovenia. The study is organized as follow: In this part a short 
introduction and main objectives of the study are given. Second part proceeds the importance of 
FDI in transition economies. Also, within this part additionally, a general discussion on the 
importance of the FDI to transition economies of South East European Countries is presented. In 
this section some macroeconomic data for these countries are also presented including the 
overview of trends and characteristics of FDI. In the third part of the study a theoretical framework 
for identifying the main determinants of FDI and some of the empirical work on these 
determinants is reviewed. In the fourth section we focus primarily on the panel econometrics 
model and under random effect specification we estimate the equation presenting the determinants 
of FDI in SEECs. The section continuous with discussion of the results and conclude with policy 
implications discussion.    
2. The importance of FDI in transition economies. FDI dynamics in SEE 
countries  
Following the transition processes of the SEEC economies from centralist and planned 
systems to market oriented systems, there has been an increasing interest in Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) in these countries. In line with this a large number of countries went through 
transition processes paying subsidies to attract FDI. One justification of this is that social returns of 
FDI exceeds private returns, because of productivity spillovers from FDI to domestic firms. 
(Haskel. J, Pereira. S, Slaughter.M, 2002).  
 
2.1 The importance of FDI in transition economies 
 Due to the significance of productivity spillovers that host countries experiences from 
inward FDI, the determinants of Foreign Direct Investment have been extensively studied. Host 
countries benefited from knowledge and technology transfer to domestic firms and to the labour 
force. Also, they benefited from enhanced competition and improved access for exports abroad, 
notably in the source country, therefore FDI is considered as important catalyst for the economic 
transformation of the transition economies. (Blomstrom M, Kokko A, 2003). Its importance is 
moreover seen to be in providing sufficient financial resources for the acquisition of new plants 
and equipment, and also in the transfer of organizational forms from relatively more 
technologically advanced economies. (Blomstrom M, Kokko A, 2003).    
The importance of FDI also lies in its ability to increase competitiveness in the host 
country local market, which result in the correction of domestic market failures to reflect the 
spillover benefits (Blomstrom M, Kokko A, 2003). The entry of new foreign firms into the host 
country market, raises the demand for domestically produced products in the host country, which 
leads to entry of other new firms and product varieties in the imperfectly competitive sector, and 
the reduction in the cost of production. This increase in competitiveness attracts further foreign 
investors, into the country, raising national income and welfare. This motivates the host country to 
  
 
subsidize FDI, in competition with other host countries that see the same potential gains. 
(Blomstrom M, Kokko; 2003) 
 .  
2.2 FDI Dynamics in SEEC. General relation of FDI to transition economies of South East 
European Countries and some comparisons with other economies  
The region of South East Europe
2
 is comprised of  ten ex socialist countries: Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Moldova, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Romania 
and Kosova  
South East European Countries in comparison with other transition economies of Central 
East European Countries lagged well behind the former, due to Balkan crisis that the region of 
SEE has experienced during the past decade. The slow progress of these countries also can be 
attributed to inconsistent macroeconomic stabilisation policies. 
 In global context, transition European countries, including SEE have relatively small 
fraction of FDI of world total amount. However, the situation has been improved over time since 
their share is increasing constantly compared to other parts of the world, thus reinforcing a 
successful reintegration of these countries into the world economy. 
 
Table 1 Inward Stock of FDI (in million of US$) 
Region 1990 1995 1999 2000 20001 2002 2003 2004 
World 207878 341086 1092052 1396539 825925 716128 632599 648146 
Developed 
Countries 
172067 218738 849052 1134293 596305 547778 442157 380022 
Developed 
Countries share of 
world total (%) 
 
82.7 
 
64.12 
 
77.74 
 
81.22 
 
72.19 
 
76.49 
 
69.89 
 
58.63 
Developing 
Countries 
35736 117544 232507 253179 217845 155528 166337 233327 
Developing 
countries share of 
world total (%) 
 
17.19 
 
34.46 
 
21.29 
 
18.12 
 
26.37 
 
21.71 
 
23.22 
 
35.99 
Central and Eastern 
Europe 
75 4803 10492 9067 11775 12821 24106 34897 
CEE share of world 
total (%) 
0.03 1.4 0.9 0.64 1.42 1.7 3.81 5.38 
Source: UNCTAD, 2005 (UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics  
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/tdstat30_enfr.pdf) 
 
From the table 1 it can be seen that the world stock of FDI grew by 32.07% between 1990 
and 2004. According to the data that reflect the FDI inflow, table 1 shows that at the beginning of 
last decade, significant part of FDI inflow, was concentrated in developed countries. This trend 
decreased constantly over the years which is justified by shifting of FDI stock in Developing 
Countries. As concern to transition countries of CEE at the start of transition period in 1990 the 
total inward stock of FDI in these countries was less than 1%. Its level increased significantly in 
1995 to 1.4%. After this period, the FDI inward stock in CEE felt gradually until the year of 2000 
and then the trend enjoyed a steady rise up to 2004.  
 Turning to the transition economies of SEE, the general trend of FDI inflow in South East 
European Countries has been improved, and these countries have received significant level of FDI 
from the years of 1990 to 2004. In a global scale, the share of SEE countries is not very large, but 
this share has been rising in the last few years. However, the importance of FDI in the transition 
economies of SEE can be analysed through the relative indicator of FDI inward stock as a 
percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) in the relevant country (table 2). This indicator 
enables us to reveal the potential effect of accumulated FDI on the overall national economic 
activity (Skuflic L, Botric V, 2006).  
 
Table 2 FDI inward per capita in SEEC and CEC (In %) 
FDI inward per capita in SEEC and CEC* 
Years 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
                                                          
2
 The above countries are listed according to EBRD approach 
  
 
Albania 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.16 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.19 
Bosnia 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.17 0.21 
Bulgaria 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.24 0.26 0.31 
Croatia 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.11 0.09 0.13 0.19 0.21 0.30 0.36 0.38 
Macedonia 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.25 0.25 0.22 0.22 
Romania 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.22 0.25 
Serbia 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.15 0.17 
Czech 
Republic 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.24 0.30 0.39 0.45 0.52 0.50 0.53 
Estonia 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.23 0.33 0.44 0.48 0.53 0.60 0.72 0.87 
Hungary 0.17 0.25 0.29 0.39 0.44 0.48 0.49 0.53 0.56 0.59 0.60 
Latvia 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.21 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.33 
Lithuania 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.28 0.27 0.29 
Poland 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.13 0.16 0.21 0.22 0.25 0.26 0.25 
Slovenia 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.19 0.16 0.15 
Slovakia 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.11 0.18 0.23 0.35 0.36 0.35 
   Source: UNCTAD: Handbook of Statistics 2007- 
http://stats.unctad.org/Handbook/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=153 
http://stats.unctad.org/Handbook/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=142 
*calculations done by the author 
 
As it can be seen from table 3, the SEECs became more attractive for investors during the years 
after 2000. In the year 2000 the highest inward FDI as a percentage of GDP was recorded in 
Croatia (0.19), Bulgaria (0.18) and Romania (0.18). The same countries remained the main 
recipient of FDI in the region, during the coming years. The lowest level of FDI inward stock in 
2000 were recorded in Bosnia (0.09), Macedonia (0.11) and Serbia (0.12). After the year of 2000, 
the situation changed in favour of SEECs. This potential change of trend can be attributed to 
improvement of macroeconomic stabilization policies and consistent conditions for investment. 
Another explanation for this can be the successful negotiation between the SEE countries and the 
EU leading to their eventual membership of the EU, which means that the region, has successfully 
completed its transitional period leaving behind the devastating consequences of national conflicts.   
 
2.3 FDI trends in SEEC 
FDI inflows into SEECs were low during the years of 1980 and 1990, obviously, due to 
high level of centralization of the economies and state owned companies. At the end of 2000 the 
cumulative FDI flows in SEEC was 3 614 millions of dollar, which represent 16.57 percent of total 
FDI in the ten new EU members (table 3). Slow progress in reforms, political instability  can be 
the main reasons for the low levels of FDI inflow in SEECs. However in relation to FDI, the 
situation improved dramatically since 2000, reaching its pick in 2003. A detailed structure of 
cumulative FDI inflow in SEEC can be seen from the table 3. 
 
   Table 3 Foreign Direct Investment: Inward Flows – Continued – Millions of Dollar 
Inward Flows – Flux Entrants 
Years 1980 1990 1995 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
SEEC 24 71 748 3694 3614 4466 3790 8365 10778 
New EU 10 
members
3
 
123 1050 12693 20260 21810 19569 23288 12067 20341 
SEEC share 
of New EU 
1O (%) 
19.51 6.76 5.89 18.23 16.57 22.82 16.27 69.32 52.98 
Albania - - 70 41 143 207 135 178 426 
Bosnia and 
Hercegovina 
- - 0 177 146 119 265 381 497 
Bulgaria - 4 90 819 1002 813 905 2097 2488 
Croatia - - 114 1472 1087 1564 1126 2042 1076 
Macedonia - - 9 33 175 442 78 95 151 
Romania - - 419 1041 1037 1157 1144 2213 5174 
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 In the sample of new 10 EU members are included: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia.  
  
 
Serbia and 
Montenegro 
- - 45 112 25 165 137 1360 966 
Yugoslavia 
(former) 
24 67 - - - - - - - 
Sources: UNCTAD 2005 (http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/tdstat30_enfr.pdf 
           
FDI inflows into the SEEC have increased from 24 million dollars in 1980 to 10.778 
billions  of dollar in 2004. The amount of FDI inflow in SEEC  in 1990 represented 6.76% of the 
total FDI to the new EU 10 member countries. In 1995 the share of SEECs FDI inflow as a 
percentage of ten new EU members total FDI inflow slightly decreased to 5.89%. In 2000 SEEC – 
8  countries attracted approximately 16% of total FDI inflows to the new 10 EU members, and 
total FDI inflow of SEEC to the new 10 EU member countries increased significantly in 2003 by 
69.32 %. FDI in SEEC – 8 is highly concentrated in a few countries: Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, 
whereas other SEE countries such as Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Serbia 
and Montenegro have received negligible share of total FDI in the region. The explanation behind 
this pattern is that relatively more developed countries receive more FDI in comparison to least 
developed countries. However the trend is not in accordance with the traditional hypothesis that 
relates FDI with cheaper factors, especially price of labour. (Skuflic L, Botric V; 2006).  
3. Theoretical framework identifying the main determinants of FDI 
John Dunning (1981) proposed comprehensive theoretical framework of FDI flows. From 
the rich set of literature that provides the theoretical framework of FDI within the international 
business concept we have chosen an eclectic approach; the ownership, location and internalization 
(OLI) p aradigm.  It is John Dunning who founded the eclectic theory of FDI, via the so called O-
L-I paradigm (ownership-location-internalization), a theory that even today hasn’t lost its actuality 
and relevance. It represents a combination of the three partial theories of FDI, which focused on 
the ownership advantages, the location advantages and the internalization advantages.  
The ownership advantages or the firm specific advantages take their place among the key 
determinants of the FDI.  In order to overcome the information advantage that domestic enterprises 
may have over foreign firms, a foreign firm that enters the economy must have some offsetting 
firm specific advantage (Johnson A, 2006). Examples of these advantages include scale 
economies, brand name, managerial skill or superior technology (Johnson A, 2006). Thus, the 
multinational company decides to take advantage of its own advantages, which derives from the 
economy of the scope, the managerial and the marketing experience, the advanced technologies as 
a result of the abundant investments in research and development, the variety of its products and 
the like.  
The location advantages represent the motives of the firm to make use of the advantages 
that a certain country offers, such as lower costs for the work force, natural resources and the like. 
These advantages determine how attractive different locations are for productions (Johnson, A. 
2006). Given ownership specific advantages, Dunning has identified several main determinants of 
location specific advantages for foreign and indigenous firms. They include factors determining 
the size and rate of growth of consumers, sales markets, production factors and capabilities,  
general infrastructure, availability and quality of inputs, policy of governments toward general 
foreign direct investment, general political, social and economic stability of the country and 
attitude of local population to foreign firms. Assuming a certain size and distribution of markets, 
and each firm is a profit maximizing operating in a price taking situation, production will be 
located where costs are lowest (Dunning 1981). In turn this will depend on the availability and cost 
of factor inputs, the efficiency at which these inputs are transformed into outputs, and the costs of 
movement from the point of production to that of marketing. (Dunning 1976). 
          The internalization advantages, represent. the motives of the firms to expand their business 
in order to accomplish lower transactional costs. (Johnson A, 2006). If the main MNC doesn’t own 
the foreign branch offices in their entirety, it will encounter huge (transactional) expenses for 
monitoring the foreign partner or the foreign markets. Internalization advantage determines how 
the MNE chooses to use its ownership advantage (Johnson A, 2006). These advantages, can be 
achieved through  protecting technology know – how, quality, brands and to leverage information 
and learning within the firms cross – border network of subsidiaries and the joint ventures 
(Oxelheim L, Radnoy T and Stonehil A, 2001).  In terms of internalization theories (Dunning 
1981, Backley and Cason 1975) explain the FDI is a result of the greater efficiency, which is 
  
 
achieved through coordination of international production which remains in the hands of the firm-
investor. The advantages of the internalization come to the force in circumstances when the 
commercial barriers or the transport costs are high, the risk from inappropriate employment of the 
specific knowledge in the firm is high, when important information asymmetries between the 
potential buyers and the sellers exist, and the like. The theories of the internalization are especially 
relevant for the industries that are based on exploitation of the resources. (Oxelheim L, Radnoy T 
and Stonehil A, 2001). 
 
3.1 Empirical approach for the main determinants of FDI 
The following factors are screened out to investigate the determinants of location of  FDI 
inflow in South East Europe. These determinants may be summarized as three categories such as 
the factors associated with improving investment environment, macroeconomic factors and 
Investment cost factors. The investment environment improving factors include openness level of 
economies, government expenditure as a share of GDP, infrastructure level of development 
measured by number of telephone and internet users per 1000 inhabitants and business 
environment conditions measured by number of days needed to open a business. Macroeconomic 
factors include growth rate of economy and gross domestic product per capita. Cost related factors 
include exchange rate, lending rate of interest and real tax revenue. They also include cost and the 
quality of labour.  
Theoretical research regarding the investment environment improving factors, as concern 
to openness of the economy,  has been focused on the studies about the relationship between FDI 
and trade as a proxy for the openness degree of the economy.  The studies have been focused on 
the relationship whether these flows are complements or substitutes. (Johnson A, 2006). Theories 
developed within this framework, vary according to relaxation of immobility assumption. (Johnson 
A, 2006). The openness of host country’s economy may encourage FDI inflows, and relatively 
closed economy may discourage FDI inflow.  If production factors are assumed to be perfectly 
immobile internationally, then no conclusion can be obtained about the relationship between FDI 
and Trade. (Johnson A, 2006). It has been found that If capital mobility is present, and the 
assumption of identical production function is relaxed, then capital movement becomes perfect 
substitute for trade (Blonigen B, 2005, Dunning 1977). However, (Markunsen 1983) by 
introducing the reasons for trade which are not based on relative factor endowments, but on the 
conditions such as external economies of scale and different production technologies, found a 
complementary relationship between FDI and trade. (Markunsen 1983). 
Macroeconomic factors variable include GDP growth and GDP per capita. The hypothesis 
of  FDI lead to economic growth is actually based on the endogenous growth model.(Choong 
Chee, Yusop Z, Soo Ch, 2004). The theoretical and empirical literature imply that, FDI, as a part 
of foreign financing has a strong positive growth impact on the recipient economy (Ledyaeva S, 
Linden M, 2006). Positive effect of FDI on economic growth may be due to technological 
spillovers, employment effects and productivity improvements. (Zorska A, 2005) In this regard, 
FDI’s contribution to growth come through transferring advanced technology from the 
industrialized to developing economies. (Ewe - Ghee Lim, 2001). To the extent, where economic 
growth through FDI is promoted , FDI may have positive impact that is similar to domestic 
investment, along with alleviating partly balance of payments deficits in the current account. As 
concern to GDP per capita variable, a higher economic developing level shows the strong 
purchasing power and good economic performance (Li Xinzhong, 2005). Meantime, this variable 
also means that the economy with high per capita GDP has high labor productivity and good local 
infrastructure. Thus, economic development level should have a positive relationship with FDI 
inflows. 
Cost related factor variables include exchange rate, interest rate, real tax revenue and 
annual average wage (Li Xinzhong, 2005). Exchange rate variable may be a measurement of rate 
of return on FDI to explain the level of FDI inflows, that is, it determines the value of repatriated 
profits or remittances (Li Xinzhong, 2005). The theoretical analysis about the relation of FDI with 
exchange rates shows explicitly that relative FDI inflows are a function of relative real exchange 
rates, and that exchange rates affect foreign direct investment, and the impact is significant, 
especially in short run (Yuqing Xing, 2006). Therefore, If one host country devalues its currency 
  
 
against that than the source country more than the other does, FDI into the former country will be 
expected to increase relative to other country.
4
 .  
.  
3.2 Theoretical Framework for empirical studies in accordance with OLI paradigm 
The empirical literature has identified different factors likely to influence the strategy of 
foreign firms toward foreign operations. These factors include the structure investment portfolios 
and risk exposures, competitive strengths and weaknesses of MNEs, their bargaining power with 
governments, their product portfolios, their liquidity position and so on.  
Dunning 1988 have argued that the failure of international intermediate product markets is 
both a necessary and sufficient condition to explain the likelihood of MNEs to engage in foreign 
operations. This is explained by linear relation of perceived costs of transactional market failures 
and the likelihood of MNEs to exploit their competitive advantages through international 
production. (Dunning 1988). Thus having regard this, it seems to suggest that the greater the 
perceived costs of market failures the higher the likelihood of MNEs for engaging in contractual 
agreements with foreign firms.  
Table 4 presents determinants of FDI inflow that have been analyzed in earlier studies 
with the intention of identifying variables that can be argued to constitute Location, Ownership 
and Internalization advantages. The first column list location advantages, while the second and 
third column list ownership and internalization advantages. The rightmost column presents the 
expected effect of each determinant on FDI inflow
5
.  
          
Table 4 Determinants of FDI used in empirical studies 
Location Advantage Ownership/internalization advantage/other Expected effect  
on FDI inflows. 
Demand / Profit potential   
GDP/Capita  + 
Market size (GDP)  + 
Market size growth (GDP growth 
rate) 
 + 
Population  + 
 Rates of return + 
Institutions 
 Cultural Proximity + 
Corruption  - 
Country Risk  - 
Policies of government  -/+ 
Privatization  + 
Transition Performance  + 
Production costs 
Capital  - 
Labour  - 
Information  - 
Infrastructure  + 
Agglomeration  + 
Transaction cost 
Geographical Distance  - 
Non Tarrif Barriers   + 
Tarrif Barriers  + 
Other 
 Exchange rate -/+ 
 Firm size + 
 Natural Resources + 
 Trade Flows. -/+ 
 Source (Johnson A. 2006)  
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The explanation for this is that, given other factors determining FDI, such as market size, growth,  labour 
skills,  political and economic stability and regulatory framework constant, MNEs are likely to invest in 
countries which devalues their currency, in order to benefit from low production cost, since the wealth and 
production cost effects are positively associated with devaluation. 
5
 This is based on a priori theoretical reasoning; There might be other studies that find other results.  
  
 
 
However,  in order to understand the determinants of FDI in transition economies, it is 
crucial to specify an empirical model that allows for a combination of traditional and non 
traditional specific determining factors of FDI.   
4. Econometric model about the determinants of FDI inflow in South East European 
economies 
 
4.1 Methodology and data description 
In the case of our sample of countries, we have chosen a combination of traditional and 
non traditional determinants presented on the literature.  In this section we will try to empirically 
assess the determinants of FDI for the SEECs. The panel data set used in this analysis cover 9 
countries
6
 and runs for a time period, 2000 – 2005. The database has been built using EBRD 
source and World Bank Source. All values used in the analysis are expressed in US dollars in real 
terms. The scope of the model, although being formulated at a relatively aggregated level, is to 
consider the diverse range of influences on decision making in investing abroad.  
Since both cross section and time series are available, we estimate equations, which take 
the following form 
ititiit xuy    
 
where the pair of terms i, t express the transversal and temporal aspects of the per country 
panel data, y is the dependent variable and x the matrix of explanatory variables, and iu is 
parameter specific to each country
7
.  
In order to assess the influence of the variables described, a foreign investment equation 
may be build up in the following linear form
8
.  
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By explaining the expected signs of the variables, we briefly discuss some of the variables 
introduced in the model. The dependent variable is FDI/Y which denotes the share of FDI to GDP 
for each country, so obviously Y is real GDP. The first explanatory variable introduced in the 
model is GY, which denotes real GDP growth and the second one denoted by y is GDP per capita. 
These variables are introduced as indicators to show the level of development, the size of the 
market, and the growth potential of each country. Investment in capital scare countries is expected 
to yield higher return indicating an inverse relationship between the levels of GDP and FDI. At the 
same time, as concern to market seeking FDI, it is expected a positive relationship between the 
income levels denoted by GDP per capita and the FDI, since driving motives for FDI by investors 
are presented by their intention for import substitution. We also expect a positive relationship 
between GDP growth and FDI. Another traditional variable measuring the market size is log of 
nominal GDP, for which we also expect the positive sign. The role of policy measure is captured 
by Gexp which denotes government expenditures as a share of GDP.  
The ratio of total trade (exports plus imports) to GDP is usually used to indicate the degree 
of openness of host country’ economy. The openness of the economy (trade regime) is captured by 
the variable named Open which is defined as the ratio of trade flow (exports plus imports) over 
GDP. The empirical studies indicate that, the higher openness is, the more favourable attracting 
FDI inflow will be, especially for the export oriented FDI inflow. Therefore, the variable of 
openness is expected to have a positive effect on FDI inflow. However, from some empirical 
studies it has been indicated that different effects of FDI inflow may take place. For example, high 
trade barriers cause the market oriented FDI inflow, and make a substitute for imports. As a result 
of this, the variable of openness may have negative effect on FDI.  
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 Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia 
7
In fact we estimate equation 1 under different assumptions about the structure of our panel data model. The 
constant is specific to each country only under the fixed and random effects model  
8
 The definition and data source of variables is presented on appendix.  
  
 
The rate of inflation is introduced as explanatory variable in order to gain information 
about investors yield. The expected effect may vary by the time when the investment is being 
made. The empirical studies indicate that relatively low average inflation rate means lower 
macroeconomic risk and therefore a higher capital flow is expected to be attracted. On the other 
hand, if the investment has happened before the inflation period, it is expected that the growth of 
product prices, the investor has invested in, should be positively associated with further FDI.   
The average exchange rate is introduced as one of the explanatory variables in order to see 
the effect of exchange rate on FDI. The exchange rate used here is per US dollar national currency. 
That is the host exchange rate. The host exchange rate may generate a mixed effect on FDI 
inflows, especially in the case of FDI being able to be a substitute for exporting from home 
country to host country because of tariff and the competitive price of goods in host country when it 
is the strength of home currency. This means that the higher host exchange rate means strength of 
home currency, which is not favorable for exports of home country to host country so as to attract 
FDI inflows for substitute of exports from home country to host country. On the other hand, the 
high host exchange rate implies the depreciation of national currency. This will discount 
remittances and returns on FDI so as to deter FDI inflows potentially. 
The non traditional variable, which is introduced in the model, such as domestic credit to 
private sector (in percent of GDP) reflect the level of development of financial system in the host 
country. It is expected that this variables to be positively related to FDI attraction.   
The variables, time required to start a business expressed in number of days, is introduced 
in the specified model, in order to capture the effect of business environment of South East 
European Countries on FDI attraction. The main hypothesis developed here is that the lower the 
number of days required for starting a business, the better the business environment in the region, 
thus, the higher the likelihood for attracting FDI.  
Two other variable that reflect the level of infrastructure development, is introduced in the 
model. The variable internet is measured as the number of internet users per 1000 inhabitants. The 
scope of this variables is to assess the role played by the quality and the concentration of 
infrastructure. A positive relationship between FDI and this variables is expected.  
Since, it has been proven that, countries with more FDI in services, and more efficient 
investment, to be those countries with high share of external debt in GDP (Valerija Botric, Lorena 
Skuflic, 2005), the variable of external debt as a share of GDP is introduced in the model, in order 
to capture the efficiency of investment in the region, particularly in service sector. Considering 
this,  it is expected positive impact of external debt as a share of GDP, on net FDI. The positive 
impact of external debt as a share of GDP, on net FDI, might be due to the increased efficiency of 
investment, and increased investment in service sector. Through increased investment activity and 
its efficiency, the growth rate of the economies should also increase.(Botric V, Skuflic L, 2004) 
The role of the FDI in this context is straightforward. Foreign investment should, almost by 
definition, positively contribute to the increased investment efficiency, since in addition to capital, 
they also introduce technology and knowledge transfer. (Lovrinčević, Marić and Mikulić, 2004)  
 
4.2 Econometric Procedures 
 Equation 2 is being considered under one method, which is random effect. By standard 
testing procedures, this methods has been proved as the most appropriate one, therefore the 
random effect method is the only that has been considered for interpreting the estimators. The 
panel consists of 9 countries, and runs for a time span of 6 years. The total number of observations 
is 54.  Having countries as observation units, a priori we expect to find varied B coefficients. The 
assumption that there are no differences between economies, can not be tested due to the presence 
of relatively few time periods in the sample.
9
 Since we are interested only in average system wide 
impacts of exogenous variable, and not in obtaining individual country coefficients, slope 
heterogeneity doesn’t matter and the Error Components Model10 versus Random Coefficients 
Model is preferred.
11
 In order to test for the most appropriate specification, we continuo with 
                                                          
9
Using relatively few time periods causes difficulties in the estimation of the random coefficient model 
(RCM), since it introduces heteroscedasticity (Green, 1997). 
10
Error Components Model (ECM) allows for heterogeneity between cross section units and / or time series, 
and interdependence between countries.  
11
 According to the rule put forward by Pesaran and Smith (1995), the presence of slope heterogeneity 
precludes dynamic specification of the model. Hence we do not include the lagged dependent variables.  
  
 
testing
12
, starting from the less restricted specification to the more restricted one. The following 
models are being considered.  
 
 
Two Way vs. One Way Model 
 
 2..logint
exp/
,1110,98
,7,65,43,2,1,
ttiti
tititititiiti
debtExternalnomGDPernetBD
DCPSERInflationOpenGyGYYFDI




 
  
   One Way Fixed Effect vs. CLRM 
 
 3.......logint
exp/
1110,98
,7,65,43,2,1,
ititi
tititititiiti
udebExternalnomGDPernetBD
DCPSERInflationOpenGyGYYFDI




 
 
One Way Random Effect vs. CLRM 
 
 4........logint
exp/
,1110,98
,7,65,43,2,1,
titi
tititititiiti
debExternalnomGDPernetBD
DCPSERInflationOpenGyGYYFDI




 
 
Fixed Effects vs. Random Effects 
 
 5......logint
exp/
1110,98
,7,65,43,2,1,
iiti
tititititiiti
udebExternalnomGDPernetBD
DCPSERInflationOpenGyGYYFDI




 
  
Having regard the first model, (two way fixed effect, two way vs one way model) we test, whether 
net FDI as a share of GDP is influenced by time effects or not
13
. By comparing two way against 
one way effect shown in the appendix (table 5), we conclude that time effects are jointly 
insignificant, and that both 2 and F14 test are in favor of One-Way Model indicating that there is 
no time specific effect on net FDI as a share of GDP
15
. This also can be supported by the fact that 
different countries have different propensity to FDI and different factors influence FDI across 
them. Having regard equation 3, when testing that all group effects are identical
16
 under F test and 
2 test, we conclude that unobservable time invariant country differences are present and the one 
way fixed effect model is preferred, versus Classical Linear Regression Model (CLRM, thereafter) 
(table 6 shown in the appendix). Equation 4, is being considered in order to examine
17
 whether, the 
variance of group specific error term is the overall constant
18
. The fact that test statistics of 3.85 is 
greater than the critical value of 2 (0.05 and df=1)=3.842 one can conclude that the test favours 
one way random effect. (table 7 shown in the appendix), therefore One – Way Random Effect 
model is more appropriate than CLRM. The Hausman test
19
 is used to choose between fixed and 
random effects. It tests the H0 that random effects ui and regressors are uncorrelated. If random 
                                                          
12
Note that there is no standard testing procedure. The literature provides us only with tentative guidelines. 
Since the more unrestricted the estimator the more assumptions and more complicated the error term, and the 
more to go wrong. Therefore, the procedure used is from the less restricted to the more restricted model.  
13
 Hypothesis  H0 suggest that time effects are 0 (H0: t = 0).  
14
 F-test for joint period effects.  
15
 Based on this previous test that one-way effects model was better specified than two-way effects model, 
hence, we continue testing whether one-way effects is more appropriate than CLRM. In this term, we test 
one-way fixed as well as random effects vs. CLRM 
16
 H0 = αi = α0; tests restrictions that fixed effects are identical. 
17
 Since  is the overall OLS constant, this test checks whether random effects are equal to the OLS 
intercept, i.e. wether they are necessary. 
18
 Breusch and Pagan’s LM statistic test is conducted in order to test the hypothesis H0: 2u=0, where it 
tests restrictions that ui= (CLRM overall constant).  This test has 2 distribution with 1 d.f.  
19
A test with the Ho that xit and i are uncorrelated (Hausman, 1978). Hasuman tests whether the fixed 
effects and random effects coefficients are significantly different, i.e. they don’t converge to the same values 
of ˆ . If this is true, Ho does not hold, i.e. xit and i are correlated, thus making the random effects 
coefficients inconsistent and inefficient. Note that the random effects coefficient is consistent and efficient 
both under Ho and the alternative, while the fixed effect coefficient only under Ho.    
  
 
effects and regressors are uncorrelated, we then estimate random effects model. Conversely, if they 
are correlated, then fixed effects model is taken. Since the Hausman statistic is smaller than its 
critical value, we can not reject Ho, that regressors (xit) and random effects (i) are uncorrelated. 
Consequently, the One-Way RE is favoured, therefore, the random effect should be kept.(table 8 
shown on the appendix). Finally, the results obtained from the above testing procedures suggest 
that One-Way random effects model is that we should take in consideration in further analyses. 
Therefore, the equation of the final model will be based on the following equation:  
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When we test for autocorrelation, the results shows that our model is robust to autocorelation, and 
therefore the model does not suffer from serial correlation.
20
, meaning that we will get unbiased 
and consistent estimators which makes the model well specified. To check for normality we plot 
the residuals (figure 1 shown in the appendix), although this procedure is very sensitive to outliers. 
The figure 1 shows that the residuals seems to have a bell shaped distribution.
21
, implying that 
there is no problem with non-normality
22
. Testing for Heteroscedasticity, whether residuals have 
constant mean and variance is difficult in panel data, with short time series. White correction is 
one solution, but it can be applied only in One-Way FE models not in Random Effect ones. 
Therefore, in order to test the robustness of the model to heteroscedasticity, we plot the residuals to 
see whether we can draw a conclusion. The plot of residuals ( figure 2 shown in the appendix) 
appears to suggest that the model has constant mean and variance indicating that the model does 
not suffer from heteroscedasticity.  
 
4.3 Discussion of the Results 
The results obtained from above testing procedures indicate that One Way Random Effect should 
be taken into consideration, for interpreting the coefficients.        
 
 Table 1 Discussion of the Results  
One Way Random Effect Model 
(FDI/Y)i,t = -9.57 – 0.40GY – 0.001Y + 0.021Gexp + 0.01OP – 0.10inflation + 0.10ER 
 t ratio          -0.56   -2.67         - 2.9       + 0.27            +0.353         -4.14*     + 1.069       
 
– 0.022DCPS – 0.063BD + 0.01IU + 1.70LOGNOM + 0.053EX.DEBT   (6) 
     - 0.49           -  0.96        +2.47*    + 1.032                 +2.771* 
 
Estimated autocorrelation -0.12 
                       Note. 
            *Significant at the conventional level of 5% level of significance 
 
As it seems, from estimated equation 6 some the results obtained from estimation of random effect 
model, do not coincide with expected signs. Contrary to expectations, market size variable, such as 
GDP growth has negative impact on net FDI as a share of GDP. This is due to the fact that growth 
rate of the GDP is greater than the growth rate of the FDI in many SEEC countries. In the model, 
holding other variables constant, for each percentage increase in GDP growth, the net FDI as a 
share of GDP decreases by 0.4 percent. This relationship is due to the reasons that the region of 
South East Europe, during the analysed period was in the process of installing parliamentary 
democracy, and this result, has been attributed to deficit financing of the democratic process. 
(Frimpong J.M, Abaye Oteng, 2006). Meaning that the growth is mainly reflecting government 
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Estimated autocorrelation coefficient is -0.12 (table 4 shown on the appendix). The condition of no 
autocorrelation is satisfied, because the p ( value) for our small sample is below 0.3 in absolute term.  
21
The figure shows that the distribution of residuals is also skewed. Nevertheless, non-normality is not 
problematic, for asymptotically the inference is correct and OLS-based estimators will still be unbiased and 
relatively the most efficient.  
22
When non-normality is a problem we cannot use the standard normality-inducing transformations as a 
remedy.   
  
 
sector deficit financing rather than the growth of real sector. Similar result suggesting the negative 
relationship between FDI and GDP growth has been found by Joseph Mangus Fripong and Oteng 
Abayie (2006), when analysing bivariate causality between FDI inflows and economic growth in 
Ghana. In favour of this argument is the example of Macedonia in 2001. Although Macedonian 
economy in that year registered a negative growth of -4.51, its net FDI as a share of GDP in that 
country was 12.83%, which is much higher in comparison to previous year, and the rest of the 
years of analysed period. The results indicate that there is negative relationship between net FDI as 
a share of GDP and GDP per capita, although the size of the coefficient is not very high. Holding 
other variables constant, for a unit increase in GDP per capita, net FDI as a share of GDP 
decreases by 0.001 percent. The negative and significant coefficient of income per capita on net 
FDI as a share of GDP, supports the absolute income convergence hypothesis among countries, 
which states that the level of per capita income of the poor countries catch up with one of the rich 
ones. (Serranito F, Guetat I, 2000). Similar result, that indicate negative relationship between FDI 
and GDP per capita,  has been found by Kabir Hasan, when studying FDI, Information technology 
and Economic Growth in MENA
23
 region. The phenomena of absolute income convergence might 
be present, due to the reason that our sample consist of countries, some of which are more 
developed (Romania, Slovenia, Bulgaria) and some others not well developed (Albania, 
Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro). The conclusion is supported by Slovenian case. Even though 
Slovenian GDP per capita is very high, its share of FDI to GDP is very low in comparison to other 
South East European Countries, due to the reasons that Slovenia is moreover concentrated on 
investing abroad, rather than attracting FDI from other places. The inflation rate is a key indicator 
of monetary policies of a country. A lower inflation rate should mean a better climate for 
investment. The results indicate that the coefficient of inflation, corrected by GDP deflator exhibit 
negative significance on FDI as a share of GDP. The negative impact of inflation upon FDI might 
be due to the macroeconomic instabilities that high inflation rates imply in the countries of South 
East Europe. (Buch and Lipponer 2004). In the model estimated, holding other variables constant, 
for each percentage increase in inflation, corrected by GDP deflator, the net of FDI as a share of 
GDP will decrease by 0.106 percent. The findings suggest that infrastructure development, 
measured by internet users per 1000 inhabitants, has significant positive impact on FDI, once 
reflecting the dominance of infrastructure, in FDI decisions. The coefficient of 0.017 means that, 
holding other variables constant, for 100 additional internet users, the net of FDI as a share of GDP 
will increase by 1.7 percent. The result suggest that improving stocks of infrastructural capital, 
increase the attractiveness of a country as a platform for multinational investment. An extensive 
network, apart from the blatant consequences in market growth, also signals the quality level of 
host country.  The positive impact of external debt as a share of GDP, on net FDI, might be due to 
the increased efficiency of investment, and increased investment in service sector. At the same 
time, countries with those characteristics – more FDI in services, and more efficient investment, 
have proven to be those with high share of external debt in GDP. (Valerija Botric and Lorena 
Skuflic). As the results indicate, holding other variables constant, 10 percent increase in external 
debt as a share of GDP, net FDI as a share of GDP increases by 0.53 percent.  
 However, contrary to expectations the results indicate that some of the variables resulted 
insignificant, and they do not affect FDI decisions. These variables include, openness measured by 
the ratio of exports plus imports over GDP, government expenditures, exchange rate, domestic 
credit to private sector as a share of GDP, number of days required to open a business, and log of 
nominal GDP.  
 
4.4 Conclusion  
We have analysed the FDI Determinants in the SEEC – 9, during the period 2000 – 2005. 
We have used panel data estimation method, and under random effect specification, we tried to 
determine whether the traditional and less traditional determinants prove to be significant for our 
sample of countries. The results show that market seeking determinants (GDP growth, GDP per 
capita, GDP level) give negative significant results under random effect specification. Since this 
result might be due to the reason that the region of South East Europe, during the analysed period 
was in the process of installing parliamentary democracy, and this result, has been attributed to 
deficit financing, undertaken to finance  the democratic processes in these countries, it seems, to 
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 The MENA countries covered in his study include Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Tunisia, 
Turkey and Yemen.  
  
 
suggest that as soon, as the democratic processes in some of these countries of the region will be 
fully installed, the positive impact of growth on FDI will be exerted. The robustness of the variable 
regarding the infrastructure, introduced as a number of internet users per 1000 inhabitants, implies 
that it is likely that the large scale improvement of physical infrastructure would have been 
facilitated by economic unions regional and financial aid. Since some of our selected countries 
(Romania, Slovenia, Bulgaria), are linked to EU, the positive effect of this variable indirectly 
reflects the crucial effect of Single European Market or other similar programmes of other 
integrated unions on the pattern of FDI.  
On the other hand, the variables openness, domestic credit to private sector as a percentage 
of GDP, even though excreted positive influence on FDI, they proved to be insignificant for the 
analysed period. This is due to the fact that compared with the need of the investing firms, this 
market may be too small. Hence, the investing firms are raising the credit outside of these 
economies. It can be concluded that as the increasing trade with other economies, and development 
of financial sector, will contribute to the stronger integration of the SEEC with other economies in 
the region, the significance of these coefficients might increase, and therefore the impact of trade 
and financial sector development, significantly might influence positive FDI decisions. The role of 
government expenditures although has a positive impact on attracting FDI it is not significant. One 
possible explanation is that the expenditures per se are not a major determinant within SEECs 
countries framework. These countries have attained a certain level of development and the share of 
governmental expenditure does not significantly fluctuate. Therefore, the incremental 
governmental expenditure will have a little effect on the probability of inducing a foreign investor 
to undertake an investment. In our case, it seems that public expenditures does not affect FDI 
attractiveness in SEECs countries.  
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Appendix 
. 
Variable 
Name 
Definition Country  Source of Data 
FDI/Y Net Foreign Direct 
Investment as a 
percentage of GDP, 
expressed in US dollars.  
The Whole 
Sample 
EBRD.  
http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/index.htm 
25 July, 2007 
GY GDP growth (annual 
percentage) 
The Whole 
Sample 
World Bank 
http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/ 
25 July, 2007 
Y GDP per capita The Whole 
Sample 
EBRD 
http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/index.htm 
25 July, 2007 
Gexp Government 
expenditure as a share of 
GDP 
The Whole 
Sample 
EBRD 
http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/index.htm 
25 July, 2007. 
OP  (trade balance over 
GDP) expressed as a 
percentage 
The Whole 
Sample 
EBRD 
http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/index.htm 
25 July, 2007 
Inflation  Inflation GDP Deflator 
(Annual %) 
The Whole 
Sample 
EBRD 
http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/index.htm 
25 July, 2007 
ER Exchange Rate (official, 
annual average) – dollar 
per National Currency 
The Whole 
Sample 
EBRD 
http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/index.htm 
25 July, 2007 
DCPS Domestic Credit to 
Private Sector in % of 
GDP. 
The Whole 
Sample 
EBRD 
http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/index.htm 
25 July, 2007 
 
BD Time Required to Start a 
Business (Number of 
Days) 
The Whole 
Sample  
World Bank, http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/ 
25 July, 2007 
 
IU Internet Users per 1000 
Inhabitants 
The Whole 
Sample 
World Bank, http://devdata.worldbank.org/data-query/ 
25 July, 2007 
Log of 
Nom 
Logarithmic of Nominal 
GDP. 
The Whole 
Sample 
EBRD 
http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/index.htm 
25 July, 2007 
External 
Debt 
External Debt as a share 
of GDP.  
The Whole 
Sample 
EBRD 
http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/index.htm 
25 July, 2007 
 
--> REGRESS;Lhs=FDIGDP;Rhs=ONE,GDPGROWT,GDPCAPI,GOVERNME,OPENTRA,INFLATIO 
    ,EXCHANGE,DOMESTIC,NUMBEROF,USERSOFI,LOGOFNOM,EXTERNAL;Panel;Str=INDEX 
    ;Fixed;Period=TIME$ 
Hypothesis Tests                        | 
|               Likelihood Ratio Test                F Tests             | 
|          Chi-squared   d.f.  Prob.         F    num. denom. Prob value | 
| (2) vs (1)    24.730      8     .00173     3.267    8    45     .00509 | 
| (3) vs (1)    40.956     11     .00002     4.333   11    42     .00025 | 
| (4) vs (1)    50.985     19     .00009     2.811   19    34     .00420 | 
| (4) vs (2)    26.255     11     .00595     1.935   11    34     .06929 | 
| (4) vs (3)    10.029      8     .26298      .867    8    34     .55283 | 
| (5) vs (4)     6.736      5     .24106      .771    5    29     .57873 | 
  
 
| (5) vs (3)    16.765     14     .26893      .754   14    29     .70584 | 
+------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
Table 5 Two Way vs. One Way (Model 5 vs. 4)  
Tests T-statistic* Prob. <> CV-5% Comparisons and Indications 
 
Likelihood 
ratio test ~2 
 
6.736[df. 5] 
 
0.24106 
 
< 
 
11.0705 
TT<CV  Accept H0. 
(Favours One-Way Effect) 
 
F test 
 
0.771[df.5;29] 
 
0.10288 
 
< 
 
2.53 
TT<CV  Accept H0 
(Favours One-Way Effect) 
Estd. Autocorrelation of e(i,t)    -.128827         
Table 6  - FEM vs. CLRM 
Tests T-statistic* Prob. <> CV-5% Comparisons and Indications 
 
Likelihood 
ratio test ~2 
 
10.029[df. 8] 
 
0.26298 
 
< 
 
15.5073 
TT<CV  Accept H0. 
(Favours CLRM) 
 
F test 
 
0.867[df.8;34] 
 
0.55283 
 
< 
 
2.27 
TT<CV  Accept H0 
(Favours One-Way Effect) 
 
One Way Random Effect vs. Classical Linear Regression Model 
--> REGRESS;Lhs=FDIGDP;Rhs=ONE,GDPGROWT,GDPCAPI,GOVERNME,OPENTRA,INFLATIO 
,EXCHANGE,DOMESTIC,NUMBEROF,USERSOFI,LOGOFNOM,EXTERNAL;Panel;Str=INDEX 
;Random$ 
| Fit          R-squared            =   .6109964     | 
|              Adjusted R-squared   =   .3936121     | 
| Estd. Autocorrelation of e(i,t)    -.128827        | 
+----------------------------------------------------+ 
+--------------------------------------------------+ 
| Random Effects Model: v(i,t) = e(i,t) + u(i)     | 
| Estimates:  Var[e]              =   .336342D+01  | 
|             Var[u]              =   .686445D+00  | 
|             Corr[v(i,t),v(i,s)] =   .169498      | 
| Lagrange Multiplier Test vs. Model (3) =    3.85 | 
| ( 1 df, prob value =  .049703)                   | 
| (High values of LM favor FEM/REM over CR model.) | 
| Baltagi-Li form of LM Statistic =           3.85 | 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+---------
-+ 
|Variable | Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z] | Mean of 
X| 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+---------
-+ 
GDPGROWT      -.40400028      .15117226    -2.672   .0075    4.67777778 
GDPCAPI       -.00100039      .00034289    -2.918   .0035    3662.35981 
GOVERNME       .02172863      .08036613      .270   .7869    40.7314815 
OPENTRA        .01258366      .03569692      .353   .7245    22.2733333 
INFLATIO      -.10616498      .02561864    -4.144   .0000    11.3348148 
EXCHANGE       .01057123      .00988599     1.069   .2849    54.3011111 
DOMESTIC      -.02247777      .04509451     -.498   .6182    20.0888889 
NUMBEROF      -.06370145      .06608898     -.964   .3351    44.6851852 
USERSOFI       .01795931      .00725479     2.476   .0133    122.635370 
LOGOFNOM      1.70855750     1.65551754     1.032   .3021    10.0544444 
EXTERNAL       .05331649      .01923777     2.771   .0056    61.2462963  
 Constant     -9.57671206     16.8350184     -.569   .5695 
 
Table 7 
Random Effects Model: v (i,t)=e(i,t)+u(i) Estimates 
Var [e] .336342D+01 
Var [u] .686445D+00 
Corr [v ( i, t), v (i,s)] .169498 
Langrange Multiplier Test vs Model (3) = 3.85 (.049703) < 2 (1 df)= 3.842 
 
Fixed Effect Model vs. Random Effect Model 
--> REGRESS;Lhs=FDIGDP;Rhs=ONE,GDPGROWT,GDPCAPI,GOVERNME,OPENTRA,INFLATIO 
    ,EXCHANGE,DOMESTIC,NUMBEROF,USERSOFI,LOGOFNOM,EXTERNAL;Panel;Str=INDEX$ 
  
 
            | Random Effects Model: v(i,t) = e(i,t) + u(i)     | 
            | Estimates:  Var[e]              =   .336342D+01  | 
            |             Var[u]              =   .686445D+00  | 
            |             Corr[v(i,t),v(i,s)] =   .169498      | 
            | Lagrange Multiplier Test vs. Model (3) =    3.85 | 
            | ( 1 df, prob value =  .049703)                   | 
            | (High values of LM favor FEM/REM over CR model.) | 
            | Baltagi-Li form of LM Statistic =           3.85 | 
            | Fixed vs. Random Effects (Hausman)     =    5.51 | 
            | (11 df, prob value =  .903733)                   | 
            | (High (low) values of H favor FEM (REM).)        | 
            +--------------------------------------------------+ 
Table 8 
Random Effects Model: v (i,t)=e(i,t)+u(i) Estimates 
Var [e] .336342D+01   
Var [u] .686445D+00     
Corr [v ( i, t), v (i,s)] .169498       
Fixed vs Random Effects (Hausman) (3) = 5.51 (.049703) < 2 df = 4;1%)=13.27  
 
Figure 1 – Normality test 
 
Figure 4.2 – Heteroscedasticity Test. 
Checking for Heteroscedasticity
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